Medicaid and Medicaid Cost Containment in Massachusetts by Waldstein, Fredric A.
New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 6
1-1-1989




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the Elder Law Commons, Health Policy Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of
Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waldstein, Fredric A. (1989) "Medicaid and Medicaid Cost Containment in Massachusetts," New England Journal of Public Policy: Vol.







The purpose ofthis article is to describe Medicaid'sfinancial structure and examine cost-
containment efforts to limitfuture growth ofthe program, particularly pertaining to Mas-
sachusetts. The principalfocus is the Massachusetts Department ofPublic Welfare and the
Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, the two agencies most responsiblefor Medi-
caid cost containment in the commonwealth. Because elected officials are unwilling to
face directly the troublesome issues surrounding Medicaid and its growth, the government
agencies responsiblefor cost containment have been left to define the scope ofthe prob-
lem, design remedial strategies, and evaluate their success. This process isfound wanting
on several counts that are not necessarily thefault ofthe state agencies. What is needed is
a national cost-containment policyfashioned by elected officials that provides a compara-
tiveframeworkfor evaluation across states.
The inclusion of Medicaid in the 1965 law evolved when Mr. Wilbur Mills [Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee] asked me what his answer should be to the
inevitable question he thought would be asked during the legislative debate: "Isn't
Medicare an 'entering wedge' to a broader program of nationwide 'compulsory'
insurance coverage for everyone?" I suggested that if he included some plan to cover
key groups of poor people, he would have a possible answer to this criticism. Medicaid
evolved from this problem and discussion.
—Wilbur! Cohen 1
In all the scholarly literature on the origin and structure of Medicaid, perhaps nothing
captures better the ad hoc manner in which the Medicaid program was conceived than
these remarks by Wilbur Cohen, one of the principal architects of Medicare and Medi-
caid. Medicare was viewed as the principal health care legislation both substantively and
symbolically. The Medicaid program was an afterthought born out of tactical maneuvers
believed necessary to overcome political opposition to Medicare legislation. Medicaid has
never stepped from the shadows of Medicare in the minds of the public, politicians, and
the media, who persist in viewing it as a second-class, perhaps vestigial appendage of
Medicare.
Fredric A. Waldstein is assistant professor ofgovernment at Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts. He was a
fellow ofthe John W. McCormack Institute ofPublic Affairs at the time he undertook this study.
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But the growth of Medicaid as a major budgetary item has been remarkable. Medicaid
assistance payments for the nation in 1988* are projected to be a staggering $47.8 billion. 2
Medicaid is the largest single item in the Massachusetts state budget, accounting for be-
tween 13 and 15 percent of the total budget. Expenditures for the Massachusetts Medicaid
program in 1988 are projected to reach $1 .5 billion. 3
The history of the Medicaid program may be divided into four eras. 4 In the start-up era,
from 1965 through 1971, states began to develop their Medicaid programs with various
benefit packages. It became clear that original estimates for Medicaid costs were severely
underestimated. The Medicaid budget for 1971 was double the original estimate, and the
budget from 1965 through 1971 grew 31 percent. The second era began with the 1972
amendments that expanded Medicaid services and broadened the definitions of eligibility.
From 1972 to 1976 the annual average increase in cost was 23 percent. The third era,
1976-1980, may be identified as the era of Medicaid inflation. Costs continued to rise at
an annual rate of 12 percent even though there was no significant expansion of medical
services. Indeed, the number of Medicaid recipients actually decreased. The fourth and
final era includes the 1980s and is characterized as one of fiscal retrenchment. Concern
over growth in Medicaid expenditures has been exacerbated by a political climate hostile
to government programs in general. The Reagan administration initiated a number of
program changes, and Congress included restrictive provisions in the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). These efforts have been widely acknowledged as
primarily cost-cutting measures, and the rate of growth has been reduced in recent years. 5
Between 1983 and 1987, the national Medicaid costs grew by an annual average of 8.4
percent, while total national spending for health care increased by an annual average of
8.6 percent. 6
Medicaid Eligibility and Caseload
Medicaid was established by Congress under Title XIX of the Social Security Act as
amended in 1965 to provide health care for the poor. Participation in the Medicaid pro-
gram by the states is voluntary. 7 Benefit costs and administrative costs are shared by the
states and the federal government, but the states are responsible for administering the
program.
Because Medicaid is an entitlement, the program must pay for the covered health care
costs of all eligible persons. Within federal guidelines, states are given substantial latitude
to determine eligibility requirements, the range of services offered, and reimbursement
policies. While eligibility requirements keep many poor people from taking advantage of
the program, it nonetheless is the principal source of health care funding for the poor in
Massachusetts and in the nation. 8
Federal Medicaid regulations require states to provide certain benefits to recipients,
including inpatient and outpatient hospital care; skilled nursing home care; physician
services; laboratory and radiology services; home health care; dental care; and preven-
tive health care for children. Massachusetts provides additional health care services to its
Medicaid patients, including prescribed drugs; care in intermediate nursing homes; adult
day health care; mental health care; and transportation to medical services. These options
make the Massachusetts Medicaid program one of the most comprehensive in the country.
*AII budgetary data are for fiscal years unless indicated otherwise.
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Individuals may qualify for Medicaid if they meet the criteria defining either one of two
recipient groups: the categorically needy and the medically need. The categorically needy
include all persons who received cash assistance from the Supplemental Security Income
program, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, or the Refugee Resettle-
ment program. These individuals are automatically eligible for Medicaid. The medically
needy are defined as individuals and families who are not categorically eligible but who
fall below established income thresholds and have insufficient resources to meet their
medical needs.
The Medicaid caseload in Massachusetts is expected to be approximately 273, 100 cases
per month in fiscal year 1989. Overall, the number of Medicaid cases increased approxi-
mately 4.2 percent from 1983 to 1987. Department of Public Welfare projections suggest
that the rate of growth between 1987 and 1989 will be approximately 1 .6 percent. 9 This
leveling suggests that without either a major restructuring of the eligibility requirements
or a major change in the economic status of a significant percent of the population, the
Medicaid program has reached a caseload threshold.
About 65 percent of all Massachusetts Medicaid recipients are children in impoverished
families and their parents. Elderly and disabled recipients account for approximately 35
percent. However, because a significant proportion of elderly and disabled require nurs-
ing home care or other costly treatment, they use a disproportionate share of the budget,
accounting for 75 percent of total Medicaid expenditures. 10
Program Costs
Medicaid is a vendor payment program operated as third-party coverage. That is, the
patient is treated by a health care provider, who bills the government for the cost of the
service. The government pays the provider's fee. A cost-sharing formula based on state
per capita income is used to determine the percentage of costs carried by the state govern-
ment and the federal government:
(State per capita income) 2
State share =— '— x .45,
(National per capita income) 2
Federal share = 1.00 - State share.
This formula is designed so that the federal government pays a larger proportion of the
program costs in poorer states (to a maximum of 83 percent) and a smaller proportion in
wealthier states (to a minimum of 50 percent)." Because per capita income in Massachu-
setts during the past two decades has been high compared with that of the nation as a
whole, the commonwealth has paid for 50 percent or slightly less throughout the history
of the program. The federal share rose above 51 percent between October 1 , 1977, and
September 30, 1983, reaching a high of 53.56 percent between January 1, 1981, and
September 30, 1983. 12 This corresponds with a time when the Massachusetts economy
was quite sluggish. At the other end of the spectrum is Mississippi, which consistently
ranks as the poorest state using the cost-sharing formula. The federal government has
never paid for less than 77 percent of costs for the Medicaid program in Mississippi in
those years for which data are readily available. 13
Medicaid costs can be classified in three categories: the medical services offered, the
program's eligibility policies, and the policies about reimbursement to providers. Table 1
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illustrates how these categories have contributed to the rising cost of Medicaid over its
four eras. By the beginning of the third era the primary concern was how to reduce Medi-
caid's costs, since they had escalated beyond anyone's anticipation. 14 At the same time,
many state governments were under severe financial pressures induced by a lagging na-
tional economy.
While Congress and state legislatures felt obliged to maintain the Medicaid program,
they nonetheless appeared unable or unwilling to address its problems. Kenneth Wing has
characterized the status of the program this way: "Inadequate in its structure and design,
unpopular and expensive, Medicaid in its programmatic adolescence was no more loved
than it was wanted at birth." 15 Remedial measures were idiosyncratic and often inconsis-
tent, reflecting the political ambivalence of the government and the public to the Medi-
caid program.
Cost-Containment Strategies
Because Medicaid is an entitlement, states cannot exercise fiscal control by such means as
limiting the number of beneficiaries or putting a cap on the amount of total spending. If a
person meets the eligibility requirements and the health-related service is covered, the
state must pay. However, this does not mean that the states are incapable of containing
program costs. The history of the Medicaid program reveals the consideration and use of
four cost-containment strategies: cutting eligibility, cutting services, cutting provider
fees, and making the system more efficient. The first two strategies could alienate con-
stituencies, a risk that politicians prefer to avoid.
The third strategy traditionally has not been viable because physicians' fees and other
provider fees for services to Medicaid patients customarily have been set by state govern-
ments at rates lower than non-Medicaid rates. Since participation by health care providers
in Medicaid is voluntary, many simply opt not to participate. Reducing the fees creates the
risk of further lowering participation. In addition, the health care professions are repre-
sented by many powerful interest groups that oppose even tangential threats to the finan-
cial security of their members.
The fourth strategy, increasing program efficiency, typically has meant a call to stream-
line the administration of the program and put an end to fraud and abuse. 16 This strategy is
popular with politicians in part because the political risks are minimal. Advocating a
reduction in fraud as a means for ensuring that tax dollars are spent for their intended
purposes is unlikely to generate much opposition. And calls to streamline programs to
make them more efficient places much of the burden on the bureaucracies that administer
them. Bureaucracies rarely engender much sympathy from the public.
A major complaint among both critics and supporters of the Medicaid program is that
the fee-for-service system is easily abused because it provides no incentives for either
providers or recipients to be concerned about cost containment. Health care providers
who are paid to give services to recipients are the principal source of Medicaid fraud and
abuse. 17 Among the more frequent perpetrators of fraud are medical doctors, nursing
home operators, hospitals, and pharmacists. Typical of the types of fraudulent activities
that occur are filing claims for services not delivered, filing duplicate claims, overclas-
sifying services to qualify for higher fees, and inflating the cost of services. A number of
studies have documented various types of fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program. 18 This
evidence of fraud, coupled with the large increase in provider costs as illustrated in Table 1.
lent legitimacy to charges that the Medicaid system was rampant with fraud.
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Table 1
National Medicaid Costs by Category, as a
Percentage of Total Medicaid Costs
Medical Services Reimbursement Eligibility
Offered to Providers Policies
(Utilization) (Price) (Population)
Start-up era 19.4 45.2 35.4
(1965-1971)
Amendment era 43.5 30.4 26.1
(1972-1975)
Inflation era 92.3 -7.7 15.4
(1976-1980)







* Data are from 1980-1981 only. But indicators suggest that they are respresentative of the entire decade.
Source: Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1984, Document No. 0321 (Baltimore: Health Care Financ-
ing Administration, June 1986), 31-32.
The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit
On October 25, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed into law P.L. 95-142, the Medicare-
Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments. Among other things, the law authorized a
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MCFU) responsible for investigating and prosecuting
provider fraud in every jurisdiction operating a Medicaid program. The federal govern-
ment agreed to pay 90 percent of the costs incurred in fiscal years 1978-1980 in establish-
ing and operating state fraud control units. In December 1980 the federal contribution of
90 percent was limited to a unit's first three years of operation, after which the federal
contribution would be reduced to 75 percent. Among the requirements established by the
legislation were the following:
To be eligible for the increased matching rate, the State Medicaid fraud control unit
must be a single identifiable entity of state government which the Secretary [of Health,
Education, and Welfare] certifies (and annually recertifies) as meeting specific re-
quirements. Such entity must be: (1) a unit of the office of the State Attorney General
or of another department of state government which possesses statewide prosecuting
authority. . . . Any [MFCU] is required to be separate and distinct from the State
Medicaid agency. 19
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) within the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) is responsible for the certification, annual recertification, and general
supervision of the fraud units. To meet OIG certification requirements state MFCUs must
investigate provider fraud only; spend 100 percent of their time on Medicaid fraud; have a
lawyer, an accountant/auditor, and a chief investigator; and have a working agreement
with the "single state agency," that is, the agency responsible for the Medicaid program in
the state as defined by the Code of Federal Regulations.
The Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit2
The Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit was certified by the federal government
in July 1978. Under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts attorney general's office, the
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Table 2
Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, by
Professional Category: Number of Personnel and Percent
Change from Previous Year (in Parentheses)
Fiscal Year Lawyers Investigators Auditors Administrative Staff Total
1978 7 22 10 8 47
1979 11 ( + 57) 26 ( + 18) 14 (+40) 14 ( + 88) 65 (+38)
1980 11 (0) 25 (-4) 13 (-7) 13 (-7) 62 (-5)
1981 11 (0) 25 (0) 12 (-8) 11 (-15) 59 (-5)
1982 10 (-9) 7 (-72) 7 (-42) 8 (-27) 32 (-46)
1983 10 (0) 20 ( + 186) 11 ( + 57) 11 (+38) 52 ( + 63)
1984 7 (-30) 21 (+ 5) 11 (0) 9 (-18) 48 (-12)
1985 8 (+ 14) 16 (-24) 9 (-18) 8 (-11) 41 (-15)
1986 8 (0) 16 (0) 7 (-22) 7 (-13) 38 (-7)
1987* 7 (-14) 18 ( + 13) 6 (-14) 7 (0) 38 (0)
First quarter <jnly.
unit was an outgrowth of the attorney general's Nursing Home Task Force, which was
initiated in 1977 to investigate fraud and abuse in nursing homes. The MFCU, headed by
a unit chief, reports to the first assistant attorney general.
The budget of the MFCU in its first full year of operation, 1979, was just over $1.6
million. The state contributed 10 percent of total expenditures during the first three years
of the unit's existence and has contributed 25 percent since 1982 as mandated by P.L.
95-142. In the transition year, 1982, the MFCU budget dropped to its lowest level —
$1 .53 million — as the state failed to compensate fully for the loss of federal funds. Begin-
ning in 1983 Massachusetts significantly increased its contribution to the MFCU budget
to ensure that it would continue to operate at full strength. The estimated budget for the
MFCU in 1987 was slightly more than $2 million.
The MFCU has experienced significant changes in the number and type of personnel it
has retained throughout its history. The most consistent personnel trend is a decrease in
lawyers, perhaps because MFCU salaries have not kept pace with those in the private
sector. This trend is particularly problematic because it takes approximately one year
before a lawyer or an investigator is fully trained.
Table 2 indicates that from 1983 through 1987 the total number of personnel and the
number of personnel across professional categories had stabilized, compared with 1983
and before. The reason, according to the MFCU unit chief, is that the MFCU has identi-
fied what it perceives to be its most effective personnel profile, given its resources. In
addition, at least for the near future, the MFCU budget is expected to remain relatively
stable, precluding the possibility of adding significantly to the size of the staff. To com-
pensate for this perceived handicap, the unit has attempted to move more aggressively into
electronic data processing to increase the efficiency of existing staff. Savings in personnel
resources that derive from a more efficient managerial and administrative work force
may be reallocated to investigatory and legal personnel.
Prosecuting Provider Fraud
As a prosecutorial unit within the attorney general's office, the MFCU is solely con-
cerned with efforts to bring charges against individuals and corporations that have vio-
lated the law. Therefore, it is concerned only about activity that is statutorily defined as
illegal and can be prosecuted. Even though the terms "fraud" and "abuse" are commonly
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cited together when politicians and academicians speak about the causes of unnecessary
expenditures in the Medicaid program, the two terms are distinct to the Massachusetts
MFCU. Fraud is illegal and can be prosecuted; abuse is not illegal and, therefore, cannot
be prosecuted.
There exist different types of fraud and remedies to address them. 21 The most signifi-
cant sections of the Massachusetts General Laws that apply to Medicaid fraud and its
prosecution are the Medicaid False Claim Acts; the Patient Abuse, Mistreatment, and
Neglect Act; and the Nursing Home Receivership Act. The Medicaid False Claims Act is
the most significant of these statutes in that it defines fraud and provides substantial pen-
alties for providers who submit fraudulent claims to the Medicaid system. The Patient
Abuse, Mistreatment, and Neglect Act makes it a crime to willfully neglect or mistreat a
nursing home patient. The mandatory reporting clause requires persons responsible for
providing care to report suspected abuse. The Nursing Home Receivership Act provides
protection for the residents of a nursing home when an owner fails to maintain the facility
and allows conditions to deteriorate to the point where residents are at risk.
Additional tools at the disposal of the Massachusetts MFCU include law enforcement
authority to conduct investigations and seek indictments. A "home rule" provision grants
to the unit the authority to prosecute cases either in the county where an alleged crime
occurred or in Suffolk County, where the unit is located. Consequently, the unit has the
flexibility to pursue its cases in the most expeditious manner. Another tool that the MFCU
uses is the attorney general's ability to request the judiciary to convene a grand jury
whose sole purpose is to examine Medicaid fraud cases. The rationale for the special
grand juries is the complex and distinct nature of financial reimbursement fraud, which
requires specialized knowledge and takes several months to investigate.
Table 3 provides an overview of the MFCU's activity over time by professional catego-
ries of health care providers. 22 Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 3 is the large
number of investigations that did not result in either an indictment or a conviction. The
unit chief said that as a prosecutorial agency the MFCU always prefers criminal disposi-
tions. But in some cases unit investigators may feel that they do not have sufficient evi-
dence to meet the burden of proof required for a criminal conviction. In that event the unit
may turn over the evidence to another agency such as the Department of Public Welfare
for civil proceedings. Or the unit may agree to a disposition of "commitment to probation
without a finding of guilt" until the party has met whatever obligation it agreed to as part
of a negotiated settlement, at which point the MFCU will simply have the case closed or
dismissed. According to the chief, such a disposition is a hybrid between a criminal and a
civil disposition.
The fact that some cases are closed without a criminal disposition does not mean that
Medicaid fraud has gone undetected and unpunished. Frequently a case will be closed as
the result of a negotiated settlement between the accused and the MFCU that specifically
includes a noncriminal disposition. Each side has some motivation for such an outcome.
An allegedly fraudulent provider often prefers to extract himself or herself from the pro-
cess without the stigma attached to a criminal disposition. And the MFCU is amenable to
a negotiated noncriminal disposition if the accused admits committing a misdeed and is
willing to make some gesture of contrition such as repaying money owed. In either case,
both the accused and the MFCU accept the certainty of a negotiated, noncriminal disposi-
tion rather than the uncertainty of a criminal trial.
The symbolic importance associated with punishing criminal offenses with jail terms
cannot be overlooked, but in the American justice system most criminal convictions,
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Table 3
Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit: Number
of Cases, Number of Indictments and Convictions, by











Medical doctor 137 127 15 1 14 1
Osteopath 1 1 - - -
Podiatrist 16 13 3 - 3 -
Dentist 116 103 12 1 11 1
Hospital 9 9 - - -
X-ray technician 101 101 29 - 27 -
Nursing home 293 275 68 16 61 8
Home health agency 2 2 - - -
Therapist 19 18 5 - 5 -
Clinic 17 17 - - -
Laboratory 39 37 1 - 1 -
Ambulance 20 17 2 - 1 -
Drug supplier 118 114 22 13 21 13
Chiropractor 1 - - - -
Optometrist 14 14 1 - - -
Transportation 23 21 5 2 5 1
Durable medical
equipment 15 14 2 1 2 1
Residual category 415 399 62 2 29 1
Total 1,356 1,282 227 36 181 26
Source: Massachusetts Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.
especially those involving white-collar crime, do not include periods of incarceration.
Among other forms of disposition, one of the most important is some kind of financial
settlement.
Table 4 provides data on the amounts of money owed by providers from all professional
classifications in Massachusetts. The financial data are divided into several categories
over time: overpayment; restitution; fines and penalties; costs and damages; and personal
needs allowances. 23 According to the unit chief, the change in dollar amounts over time is
simply a matter of chance. In 1984, for example, a number of investigations were under-
taken that happened to result in major prosecutions.
Evaluating the Massachusetts MFCU
How well does the MFCU fulfill its responsibilities to reduce fraud in the Medicaid pro-
gram? How do its efforts compare with those of other units across the country? These
questions are difficult to answer because very little formal review is required or takes
place. Conversations with personnel in the Office of Inspector General, the federal
agency responsible for overseeing state MFCUs, indicate that reviews of MFCUs are
without criteria or guidelines that might provide a framework for evaluating and compar-
ing different state units. The only criteria are those that are required for the establishment
of a federally supported MFCU.
The OIG cannot be held entirely responsible for this situation because no consensus has
ever been reached about how to measure MFCU effectiveness. While there is ample anec-
dotal evidence of fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program, a reliable means has not been
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that are available. Efforts to negotiate or recommend noncriminal dispositions may prove
very effective as a deterrent to Medicaid fraud.
A corollary to this point is a caution not to evaluate the effectiveness of the MFCU
according to the amount of money it generates in terms of restitution, fines, penalties, and
all other mechanisms that can be measured economically. The goal of the MFCU is to
reduce fraud, not to pay for itself in funds recovered. If the unit's primary concern is
accounting for itself economically, it is not giving priority to fraud prevention.
Two specific MFCU activities involving strategies and principles of operation can be
qualitatively evaluated: maintaining open communications with state and federal agencies
that can cooperate with the unit as it pursues its mission and developing investigatory and
prosecutorial strategies that depend on analysis of past patterns of behavior rather than on
random chance to attain successful results.
By all accounts, the relationship between the MFCU and the single state agency respon-
sible for the Medicaid program, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW), is good. With-
out a professional relationship marked by a spirit of cooperation, the MFCU would have a
difficult time fulfilling its responsibilities. Indeed, a number of MFCUs in different states
have recommended that rules and regulations be implemented by the federal government
requiring the state agencies to cooperate more fully with the units or giving the units the
authority to access data without permission from the state agencies. 26 In Massachusetts the
positive working relationship between the MFCU and the DPW fosters the goals of both
organizations.
A typical example of the relationship between the Massachusetts MFCU and the DPW
is their joint development and use of an antifraud computer system. The federal govern-
ment has encouraged state agencies to participate in a computerized provider payment and
user-oriented system, the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS). A major
feature of the MMIS is the Surveillance and Utilization Review Subsystem (SUSR), a
computer program designed to detect aberrant billing patterns that may indicate fraud.
The Massachusetts MFCU and DPW together developed and designed the state's system,
which the MFCU believes to be very effective. In addition, the unit is sensitive to the
need to maintain a high level of visibility and to keep the channels of communication open
with other government agencies.
The MFCU acknowledges that it has not made an effort to analyze past patterns of
behavior to determine whether it is operating as close to maximum efficiency as possible.
The unit has not maintained statistical records on case referrals that designate the sources
of its investigations. Without these data the unit does not have any way to monitor accu-
rately where referrals originate or whether certain sources have a higher probability of
uncovering and leading to prosecution of fraud. 27 Careful analysis of cases and case refer-
rals could be used to maximize the yield of future investigations and make success less
dependent on chance. 28
The Role of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW)
In Massachusetts the single state agency identified to administer the Medicaid program is
the Department of Public Welfare. Its responsibility, however, does not extend to deter-
mining what fees will be paid to health care providers. That is the responsibility of the
Rate Setting Commission, which establishes reimbursements rates for all medical, educa-
tional, and social services purchased by the state. 29 Detection and prosecution of fraud in
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the Medicaid program is the responsibility of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, under the
jurisdiction of the state attorney general's office.
The question remains why responsibility for these two aspects of Medicaid — determin-
ing providers' fees and ending fraud and abuse — should be removed from the state
agency responsible for administration of the program. At least part of the answer seems to
be lack of faith by legislators and other government officials in the capacity or willingness
of a large social welfare bureaucracy to cooperate in such ventures. 30 Because the Medi-
caid budgets of the state agencies increased so dramatically in the 1970s the agencies were
perceived to be part of the problem and legislators turned elsewhere for development and
implementation of cost-containment measures. In Massachusetts, developing cost-con-
tainment strategies did not appear to be a high priority within the DPW until the mid-
1980s, when additional resources were provided by the legislature specifically to develop
comprehensive cost-containment measures.
DPW Cost-Containment Efforts
Substantial changes in the state's administration of Medicaid in recent years reflect the
DPW's efforts to respond to demands for greater efficiency. In 1979, the DPW developed
what is now called the Medicaid Savings and Expenditure Control Agenda (SECA).
Meaningful efforts to implement SECA did not occur until 1984, however, when addi-
tional resources to develop savings initiatives became available. 31
Primary responsibility for the Medicaid program in the Department of Public Welfare
rests with the Medical Assistance Division (MAD), which was authorized to employ 423
individuals in 1986. The changes that have occurred in the administration of Medicaid in
recent years include adding resources, redeploying staff, and consolidating program
management, administrative, and savings activities. Reorganization efforts were under-
taken in response to four factors that were identified as exerting upward pressure on Med-
icaid expenditures: (1) provider rate increases, (2) lack of control over service utilization,
(3) substantial long-term growth in the elderly population, and (4) expensive advances in
medical technology. 32 Growth in the elderly population and advances in medical technology
are constraints over which the DPW has no control. The department's cost-containment
efforts have been focused on provider rate increases and service utilization.
The DPW's reorganization efforts resulted in a substantial budget increase for the Medi-
cal Assistance Division from $4.96 million in 1986 to $16. 1 million in 1987. The substan-
tial hike was due to a transfer of funds to the division to accompany the transfer of
Medicaid-related responsibilities that had previously been performed by Contract Opera-
tions and Management and Support, two other DPW agencies. Table 5 presents a profile of
MAD employees by professional category. The organizational structure ofMAD is de-
signed to facilitate both short-term and long-term goals, including
• restructuring Medicaid management to better coordinate program and
reimbursement policies with savings policies;
• redirecting the emphasis of Medicaid expenditure control from managing
a savings agenda alone to managing spending as well; and
• focusing attention on provider rates and inappropriate utilization of services.
The division has identified several strategies to help meet these goals. 33
Among the strategies is selective contracting with cost-effective providers for specified
services at a previously negotiated price. A typical contract is based on capitation; that is,
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Table 5
Persons Employed by the Medical Assistance Division
of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare for
Fiscal Year 1988, by Professional Unit
Professional Unit Employees
Provider Reviews 104
Long Term Care/Elderly Choices 80
Operations/Provider Relations 80
Third Party Liability 63





Total personnel employed by MAD is listed by the DPW as 423, the number authorized by the
state legislature. Data were unavailable for the 23 individuals unaccounted for.
Source: Budget Narrative for FY89 (Boston: Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, February 1988), 400.
providers agree to set fees in return for a guaranteed percentage of patient volume. A
related strategy is to use the state's market leverage and purchasing power to require
providers that do business with the state to accept Medicaid patients under specified
conditions. For example, many health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have in the
past been inaccessible to Medicaid recipients, forcing them to rely on hospital out-
patient care and other more expensive services. The Group Insurance Commission now
requires HMOs with contracts for state employee health insurance to contract for Medi-
caid recipients.
Much more emphasis is currently being placed on utilization review than was true in the
past to help identify abuse of the system or inappropriate delivery of services. These re-
views are taking place before, during, and after service delivery. A typical review in-
cludes pre-admission screening of all hospital admissions to ensure that a treatment or
procedure is necessary and appropriately screened; ongoing case management of lengthy
hospital stays to ensure against high costs incurred in a hospital when the home or some
other setting is adequate for care; and systematic audits of providers' billing reports to
identify providers whose practices deviate from those of their peers.
The division is also examining and experimenting with several different reimbursement
strategies that move away from the fee-for-service system, which offers no incentive to
providers to limit health care costs and, indeed, encourages the opposite. Capitation is
one model that can give providers incentives to offer economical health care. A second
model is based on prospective payments to nursing home providers according to the level
of care that each patient requires, similar to the payment structure under Medicare. Such
a system would encourage nursing homes to accept and treat elderly who require more
than minimal long-term care, an option that is perceived to be more cost-effective than
keeping such people in acute-care hospital settings.
A major effort is under way to identify and pursue any individual, institution, corpora-
tion, or public or private agency that is liable for all or part of the medical costs incurred
by Medicaid patients. Federal and state law requires that Medicaid be the payer of last
resort, yet it is estimated that 34 percent of Massachusetts Medicaid recipients have some
form of health insurance through Medicare, Medex, Blue Cross, or other entity that is
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liable for payment before Medicaid. MAD's Third Party Liability Unit is responsible for
accumulating and processing third-party insurance information and collecting money
from providers that has been inappropriately paid by Medicaid rather than by the legally
responsible person or agency.
Another set of strategies focuses on developing service delivery systems that offer alter-
natives to institutional placement and care. Many patients are inappropriately placed or
left in institutional settings, and finding more suitable settings can be cost-effective. Al-
ternative models include community-based long-term care services that allow the elderly
and disabled to live at home with an adequate support system; managed care programs
that strive to achieve preventive and coordinated health care options for families, reducing
the need for costly emergency, outpatient, and inpatient hospital services; and pilot pro-
grams such as the one at the East Boston Neighborhood Health Center, which offers capi-
tated long-term care using a number of resources including Medicaid. The Massachusetts
Medicaid program has traditionally been open to experimenting with pilot projects de-
signed to determine if health care services can be provided more effectively and effi-
ciently for a target group. 34
According to the DPW, the "single most important tool in support of the Department's
Medicaid savings agenda is the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS),
which processes approximately 24 million Medicaid claims annually from over 29,000
different medical providers." 35 MMIS is an electronic data processing system that has
improved the efficiency of recording and processing Medicaid claims by simultaneously
reducing the error rate and speeding up the provider claims process. But MMIS is more
than a computerized accounting system; it is also a management tool that can be tailored
by each professional unit in the Medical Assistance Division to meet its record-keeping
needs.
In terms of cost containment, the Department of Public Welfare claims the following
savings in the Medicaid program over time: fiscal year 1982, $11 million; fiscal year
1983, $32 million; fiscal year 1984, $106 million; fiscal year 1985, $155 million; fiscal
year 1986, $217 million; fiscal year 1987, $288 million; and the fiscal year 1988, $338
million. It is difficult to evaluate the accuracy of these figures without detailed informa-
tion about the methodology used to arrived at them. But one measure that suggests that
savings are taking place is the annual rate of growth in cost of the Massachusetts Medicaid
program compared with growth in health care costs generally. From fiscal year 1983
through 1987, total national spending for health care increased 8.6 percent, for Medicaid
8.4 percent, and for the Massachusetts Medicaid program 7.6 percent. This suggests that
some substantial savings have been realized. However, a 7.6 percent annual growth rate
can still mean an increase of more than $100 million per year in overall costs to the Mas-
sachusetts Medicaid program.
Effect of Cost-Containment Strategies on
Medicaid Recipients
The prominence given to increasing the level of efficiency and to controlling costs in the
Massachusetts Medicaid program apparently has not led to state policies, either intended
or unintended, that have reduced the number of Medicaid patients. Indeed, as noted at the
outset, the number of Medicaid cases has increased approximately 4.2 percent from fiscal
year 1983 through 1987, although future growth is expected to be less.
A number of efforts have increased the access of the poor to health care facilities.
For example, since 1985 the Medicaid program has enrolled approximately 6,300 new
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providers, about 3,000 ofwhom are physicians. Success for increasing physician partici-
pation may be attributed to two factors: requiring HMOs who enrolled state employees to
accept Medicaid patients and working with the Rate Setting Commission to bring physi-
cian fees close to market rates. The same strategies have been used to encourage partici-
pation by other health care providers. As a result, nearly 25,000 new recipients were
placed in some managed health plan.
Justification for moving in this direction is the commonly held belief that preventive
health care through HMOs is more cost-effective than services in acute-care hospitals
and other institutions. Virtually all of the DPW's strategies are designed to remove as
many recipients as possible to the least costly care facility that is appropriate to serve
their needs.
Managing the Medicaid caseload in this way makes sense from the perspective of cost
containment. What remains open to debate is how this strategy affects the quality of care
recieved by Medicaid recipients. Very little systematic analysis of the question has been
undertaken for the Massachusetts Medicaid program. The federal government has placed
the burden of proof on those who claim that the provision of health care for Medicaid
recipients has declined.
Conclusion
The history of the Medicaid program is an example of what can happen to a public policy
initiated for political expediency. It was and, in the minds of many, remains a derivative
program of Medicare without a strong political constituency. Consequently, it drifted
along without adequate focus from 1965 until the 1970s, when it was perceived to be an
example of wasteful government programs that unnecessarily burden taxpayers.
The simplest political solution for elected officials was to target fraud rather than other
aspects of the program and to hold culpable the state and federal bureaucracies responsi-
ble for running the program. Because those bureaucracies were perceived to be part of the
problem, another bureaucratic layer, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, was created to
remedy the problem in each state.
Whatever the merits of the charge that fraud and abuse were principal causes of waste in
the Medicaid program, the elected officials did not make credible estimates of how much
fraud existed, nor did they reach any consensus concerning its causes. Consequently, no
standards were set to measure efforts to combat fraud and abuse. The MFCUs were left
largely to define their own missions and criteria for evaluation once they had conformed
to the minimal standards necessary for federal government approval. In short, the MFCUs
have been allowed to drift much as the Medicaid program itself has.
Because the single agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in each
state was intentionally superseded by the MFCUs in efforts to curb fraud and abuse, there
was little reason to expect cooperation between these agencies and the MFCUs. Indeed, in
several states the MFCUs reported a hostile relationship with their state agency. Such
hostility should not be interpreted as evidence of the state agencies' lack of interest in
fraud control or taken as a blanket justification for establishing independent fraud control
units. Rather, it may reflect bureaucratic turf protection stemming from some combina-
tion of resentment by the state agency for being cut out of the fraud control process, disin-
terest by the state agency because it believes fraud control is no longer its problem, or the
difficulties encountered in transferring information across bureaucratic boundaries.
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In Massachusetts both the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and the Department of Public
Welfare, the agency that administers Medicaid, claim to give high priority to developing
and implementing cost-containment strategies in the Medicaid program and to cooperat-
ing toward that end. The DPW has incentives to ensure that, in light of limited resources,
services are allocated as efficiently as possible to their Medicaid clients. There is no
evidence that the DPW ever opposed efforts to reduce fraud and waste. For both the
MFCU and the DPW cost containment is consistent with their government mandate and
professional pride. The DPW did not implement cost-containment strategies until the
legislature allocated funds specifically for that purpose, but this behavior is rational from
an organizational perspective. 36
Whether or not the MFCU and the DPW have set realistic cost-containment goals and
are effectively meeting them is much more difficult to determine. Because of the failure
of elected politicians to adequately define cost-containment criteria for health care, the
bureaucracies and those who would evaluate their performance have no standards on
which to base judgments. Evidence is presented in this article that both the MFCU and the
DPW are having a positive impact on cost containment in the Massachusetts Medicaid
program. But a definitive judgment can be made only after evaluation methodologies are
developed that can be used to assess performance across states. This will require leader-
ship from elected officials to produce a national cost-containment policy with clearly
defined goals and sufficient agreement about how to measure whether those goals are




Wilbur J. Cohen, "Reflections on the Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid," in Health Care Fi-
nancing Review (Baltimore: Health Care Financing Administration), 1985 Annual Supplement, 1
.
2. Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1986, Document No. 03247 (Baltimore: Health Care Financing
Administration, September 1987), 7.
3. Budget Narrative for FY89 (Boston: Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, February 1988), 231.
4. Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1984, Document No. 03210 (Baltimore: Health Care Financing
Administration, June 1986), 31-32.
5. The debate rages about whether these changes have had a negative impact on the health of the
poor. There is little doubt that some who were eligible for medical treatment under Medicaid no
longer are. Whether this is "cutting the fat or the bone" is the focus of the debate.
6. Budget Narrative for FY89, 230.
7. At present every state with the exception of Arizona participates in the Medicaid program.
8. The number of people in the United States living below the poverty level in 1984 was approxi-
mately 33 million, and the ratio of Medicaid recipients to persons living below the poverty level
was approximately .64. See M. Gornick et al., "Twenty Years of Medicare and Medicaid: Covered
Populations, Use of Benefits, and Program Expenditures," Health Care Financing Review, 1985
Annual Supplement, 34.
9. Budget Narrative for FY89, 256.
1 0. Budget Narrative for FY89, 222-23.
1 1 Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1984, 88.
12. Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1984, 99.
77
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
13. Medicare and Medicaid Data Book, 1986, 99.
14. By 1986 the total costs of the Medicaid program were $3.45 billion, which exceeded original
estimates by almost $1 .20 billion. Total costs for subsequent years in the 1 970s are as follows:
1971, $6.35 billion; 1973, $8.71 billion; 1975, $12.09 billion; 1977, $16.35 billion; 1979, $19.66
billion. See Data on the Medicaid Program: Eligibility, Service, Expenditures, rev. ed. (Washington,
DC: Medicaid Medicare Management Institute, 1979), 28.
15. Kenneth R. Wing, "The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program," Catholic
University Law Review 33 (1983): 18.
16. In this article "fraud" is defined as a violation of a civil or criminal statute. The term "abuse" is
much more difficult to specify. Here it refers to situations that are counter to the intention of the
Medicaid program but that are not specifically prohibited by law.
17. Fraud among recipients does occur and includes such activities as purchasing excessive amounts
of drugs, making false claims of eligibility, seeking unnecessary nursing home care, and the like.
But the opportunities and potential gains for recipients engaging in fraud and abuse are minor
compared with the opportunities for providers. See Medicaid Fraud: A Case History in the Failure
ofState Enforcement, A Staff Study by the House Select Committee on Aging (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 27 March 1982).
18. Examples include "ping-ponging" (referring a patient to a succession of practitioners); "ganging"
(billing for multiple services to relatives who accompany a patient); "upgrading" (billing for a
service more extensive than that provided); "steering" (directing a patient to a particular phar-
macy); and billing for services not rendered. Investigators also concluded that fee splitting, per-
centage lease arrangements, and kickbacks were commonly associated with Medicaid mills.
Considerable evidence of fraudulent and abusive practices was also uncovered in other settings.
Kickbacks and improper billing arrangements were shown to exist in several clinical laboratories,
and patient abuse, substandard facilities, deceptive real estate practices, false cost reporting, and
kickbacks were found in a number of nursing homes. Jennifer O'Sullivan, "Medicare and Medi-
caid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments: PL. 95-142" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, 16 November 1977), 2-3.
19. O'Sullivan, "Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments," 29.
20. For a detailed longitudinal examination of the Massachusetts MFCU see Fredric Waldstein, "Con-
trolling Medicaid Fraud in Massachusetts: A Report to the Attorney General" (Boston: John W.
McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts at Boston, February 1988).
21
.
For a detailed discussion of Massachusetts laws, regulations, rules, and procedures that pertain
to fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program, see Frank Bellotti and Donald Zerendow, "The
Attorney General's Medicaid Fraud Control Unit: Protecting the Public from White Collar Crime
and Patient Abuse in the Health Care System" (Boston: Massachusetts Attorney General's Office,
1 September 1985).
22. Some of the categories merit additional explanation. The residual category consists of all cases
that could not be placed in the professional categories identified. "X-ray technician" refers to a
specific type of investigation involving the theft of the silver residue found on old X-rays. "Home
health agency" refers to at-home health care delivery such as that provided by a visiting nurse in
a patient's home. "Therapist" refers to all forms of physical and psychological therapy. "Clinic"
refers to any walk-in, nonhospital health care facility. "Durable medical equipment" concerns
such items as wheelchairs and hospital beds; the primary type of fraud in this category is overbill-
ing or not delivering goods paid for. "Laboratory" refers to testing facilities used for diagnostic
purposes. "Ambulance" and "transportation" refer to transportation of the patient to and from
the health care provider. "Drug supplier" refers to pharmacies and drug supply companies that
dispense pharmaceuticals.
23. "Overpayment" is the amount of Medicaid funds improperly paid to providers and subject to
recovery. "Costs" and "Costs and Damages" are costs that the MFCU incurred in the course of its
investigations into fraudulent activity and that it may recover. This may include treble damages.
"Restitution" is the amount of money recovered from providers that was improperly paid by the
78
Medicaid program. "Fines and Penalties" are the monetary sanctions imposed on those con-
victed of defrauding the Medicaid program. "Personal Needs Allowance" refers to the theft or
misuse of a patient's personal discretionary funds by providers in nursing homes and rest homes.
24. "Office of the Inspector General Annual Report: January 1, 1978-December 31, 1978" (Washing-
ton, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 1 979), 1 50.
25. John Gardiner and Theodore Lyman, The Fraud Control Game: State Responses to Fraud and
Abuse in the AFDC and Medicaid Programs (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 4.
26. "Medicaid: Results of Certified Fraud Control Units," GAO/HRD-87-12S (Washington, DC: U.S.
General Accounting Office), Appendix X.
27. The unit chief estimated that approximately 35 percent are self-initiated or "proactive," 35 per-
cent are referred by the Department of Public Welfare, and 15 percent are referred by other state
and federal government agencies. These percentages are consistent with national data reported
by the OIG for fiscal year 1 985. See "Medicaid: Results of Certified Fraud Control Units," 10.
28. The unit chief recognized this as a legitimate concern and believed that increased electronic data
processing capacity would allow the unit to move in this direction.
29. It should be noted that the DPW and the Rate Setting Commission collaborate on setting rates
for the Medicaid program, but the authority to actually determine the rates is the sole responsibil-
ity of the Rate Setting Commission. The Department of Public Health (DPH) also plays a minor
role in the Medicaid program because it licenses all individuals in the health care industry. But our
attention here is directed only to the "single state agency," the Department of Public Welfare. The
DPW, as the administrator of the Medicaid program, plays a substantially more significant role
than either the Rate Setting Commission or the DPH.
30. For example, see Gardiner and Lyman, The Fraud Control Game, Chap. 6.
31
.
Budget Narrative for FY89, 399.
32. Budget Narrative for FY89, 409.
33. These are extensively described in the Budget Narrative forFY89.
34. For example, see Rosemary Gibson Kearn et al., eds., Medicaid and Other Experiments in State
Health Policy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1986).
35. Budget Narrative for FY89, 41 6.
36. The rationality of such behavior has been developed by, among others, Herbert A. Simon, Admin-
istrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1976), 66, 95-96, 120; and Herbert Kaufman,
The Limits of Organizational Change (University: University of Alabama Press, 1971 ), 29-30.
79

